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THE EMPIRICAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
CASE AGAINST THE CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTION: A CALL FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Rape is a physical and mental ordeal, which the victim must strug-
gle to overcome on many levels.1 The physical attack is only the begin-
ning of the victim's tribulations. Prosecution of the defendant exposes
the victim to a process almost as frightening as the actual attack.2 Under
these circumstances, the cautionary instruction typically given by the
judge to the jury at the end of a rape trial needlessly exacerbates the
victim's plight by casting doubt on the veracity of her testimony.3
The cautionary instruction is a relic dating back to Lord Chief Jus-
tice Matthew Hale in the seventeenth century. After gradually entering
English common law, it was exported to America. 4 Though the wording
varies substantially from state to state,5 most cautionary instructions
contain three common elements. These are: (1) rape is a charge that is
1. See S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 1-2 (1987) (personal account of a rape and subsequent
events); T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, THE AFrERMATH OF RAPE 23-38 (1979) (Typi-
cal problems after rape include changed eating habits, disrupted sleep patterns, recurring night-
mares, fear of being alone on the street or at home, decreased social activity, scorn from family and
friends, increased fear of both known and unknown men, worsening sexual relations, alienation from
boyfriend or spouse and self-hatred.).
2. See L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL REAcTIONS
221-36 (1978) (The courtroom is an upsetting experience for many rape victims due to the blame-
the-victim strategy of the defense, the confrontation between the victim and the defendant, the pub-
lic setting of the trial, the predominance of males in the courtroom and on the jury and the formality
of the courtroom.).
3. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 369-70 (1975) (The cautionary instruction
reflects society's belief that rape complainants often lie.); cf. A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, AGAINST
RAPE 111-12 (1974) (Societal view of female's chastity and fidelity as male property is reflected in
legal system.).
4. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 873-75, 538 P.2d 247, 254-55, 123 Cal. Rptr.
119, 126-27 (1975) (The cautionary instruction originated from Lord Hale's writings and was intro-
duced into the U.S. in California in the mid-nineteenth century.); Geis, Lord Hale, Witches, and
Rape, 5 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 26, 42 (1978) (Hale's instruction has become "'one of the most oft-
quoted passages in our [American] jurisprudence.'" (quoting United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547,
554 (D.C. Cir. 1973))).
5. Compare State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 863, 590 P.2d 1001, 1009 (1978) ("A charge such as
that made against the defendant in this case is one, which, generally speaking, is easily made, but
difficult to disprove even though the defendant is innocent. Therefore, I charge you the law requires
that you examine the testimony of [the victim] with caution.") with Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 940,
943, 497 S.W.2d 11, 13 (1973) ("You are instructed that the crime'of second degree rape, of which
[defendant] is charged, is a serious one, and such a charge is easily made and hard to contradict or
disprove; that it is a character of crime that tends to create a prejudice against the person charged;
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easily made by the victim, (2) rape is a charge that is difficult for the
defendant to disprove, and (3) the testimony of the victim requires more
careful scrutiny by the jury than the testimony of the other witnesses in
the trial.6
This note questions the empirical validity of the three elements of
the cautionary instruction.7 The note acknowledges that the cautionary
instruction is frequently given at rape trials in the United States;8 illus-
trates the context in which Hale used the cautionary instruction and con-
siders why this context is no longer appropriate;9 examines the various
legal problems with the cautionary instruction;'0 and concludes that the
cautionary instruction serves no valid purpose and therefore should be
abolished. The note ends with a legislative model to eliminate the cau-
tionary instruction.1'
I. THE PREVALENCE OF THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUTION
The cautionary instruction has been prohibited through legislative
enactment in five states.' 2 Other states have prohibited it by judicial de-
cree, 13 while a few simply do not use the instruction in practice.' 4 In
and, for these reasons, it is your duty to weigh the testimony carefully, and then determine the truth
with deliberative judgment, uninfluenced by the nature of the charge.").
6. See, eg., Smoot, 99 Idaho at 863, 590 P.2d at 1009; see also United States v. Merrival, 600
F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1979) ("A charge such as that made against the defendants in this case is one
which, generally speaking, is easily made and once made is difficult to disprove, even if the defend-
ants are innocent. From the nature of a case such as this, the complaining witness may be the only
witness testifying directly as to the alleged act constituting the crime. Therefore, the law requires
that you examine the testimony of the prosecuting witness with caution and consider and weigh it in
light of all the circumstances shown. In giving this instruction, the Court does not mean to imply an
opinion as to the credibility of any witness or the weight to be given his or her testimony.").
7. See infra notes 21-110 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 120-38 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
12. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-408 (1986) (prohibiting all three elements); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.347(5)(c)-(d) (West 1987) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.186(2) (Michie 1986)
(prohibiting instruction that rape accusation is easy to make); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106
(Purdon 1983) (prohibiting special scrutiny of victim's testimony); S.D. CODIPiED LAWs ANN.
§ 23A-22-15.1 (1979) (prohibiting singling out of victim's testimony).
13. By judicial decree, the cautionary instruction has been either banned or so discredited that
it is no longer used in 17 states and the District of Columbia. These jurisdictions include Alaska
(Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1254-55 (Alaska 1980)), Arizona (State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 396,
531 P.2d 151, 153 (1975)), California (People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 882-83, 538 P.2d
247,260, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 132 (1975)), District of Columbia (Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d
45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1949)), Florida (Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1986)), Georgia (Black
v. State, 119 Ga. 746, 749, 47 S.E. 370, 371-72 (1904)), Idaho (State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 863,
590 P.2d 1001, 1009 (1978)), Indiana (Taylor v. State, 257 Ind. 664, 666-69, 278 N.E.2d 273, 274-76
(1972)), Iowa (State v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Iowa 1975)), Louisiana (State v. Sel-
man, 300 So. 2d 467, 470 (La. 1974), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 906 (1976)), Missouri (State v. Davis,
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California the instruction of Lord Hale was mandatory until 1975,15
when the State Supreme Court abolished it in People v. Rincon-Pineda. 16
While a number of states followed California's lead immediately after
Rincon-Pineda, 17 since 1980 only three states have eliminated the cau-
tionary instruction.1 8
In spite of its abandonment in some states, over half of the states
allow the cautionary instruction to be issued at the conclusion of a rape
trial. These states use the cautionary instruction for a variety of pur-
poses. 19 It is most commonly used when there is no witness to corrobo-
190 S.W. 297, 298 (Mo. 1916)), Montana (State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918, 922 (Mont. 1984)), North
Dakota (State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 434 (N.D. 1984); State v. Young, 55 N.D. 194, 201-03, 212
N.W. 857, 860-61 (1927)), Ohio (State v. Tuttle, 67 Ohio St. 440,445-46, 66 N.E. 524, 525-26 (1903)
(statutory rape)), Oregon (State v. Bashaw, 296 Or. 50, 52-55, 672 P.2d 48, 48-50 (1983); State v.
Stocker, 11 Or. App. 617, 619-20, 503 P.2d 501, 502 (1972)), Virginia (Crump v. Commonwealth, 98
Va. 833, 836, 23 SE. 760, 761 (1895)), Washington (State v. Mellis, 2 Wash. App. 859, 862, 470 P.2d
558, 560 (1970)), and Wyoming (Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1044-46 (Wyo. 1986)).
14. See Arabian, The Cautionary Instruction in Sex Cases: A Lingering Insult, 10 Sw. U.L.
REv. 585, 614-15 (1978) (Although the cautionary instruction is not legislatively or judicially pro-
hibited in New York, North Carolina, or Tennessee, the courts of those states do not give the in-
struction in practice.).
15. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL 10.22 (3d rev. ed. 1970); see People v. Nye,
38 Cal. 2d 34, 40, 237 P.2d 1, 4 (1951) (cautionary instruction mandatory).
16. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 882-83, 538 P.2d 247, 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
132 (1975). Chief Justice Wright argued that the cautionary instruction "performs no just function,
since criminal charges involving sexual conduct are no more easily made or harder to defend against
than many other classes of charges, and those who make such accusations should be deemed no
more suspect in credibility than any other class of complainants." Id.
17. These states include Arizona (State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 396, 531 P.2d 151, 153 (1975)
(cautionary instruction prohibited as an unwarranted personal opinion of the judge)) and Iowa (State
v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510, 515 (Iowa 1975) (cautionary instruction is "discredited anachro-
nism" and as such is eliminated)).
18. The only states that have discarded the cautionary instruction after 1980 are Florida (Marr
v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1986)), Montana (State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918, 922 (Mont.
1984)), and Wyoming (Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1046 (Wyo. 1986)).
19. See, eg., Alabama (Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, 45-46, 3 So. 612, 615 (1887) (cautionary
instruction used to emphasize how careful a jury must be to convict a man for rape based on uncor-
roborated testimony)), Illinois (People v. Appleby, 104 Ill. App. 2d 207, 212, 244 N.E.2d 395, 398
(1968) (Strict appellate scrutiny is kept as a requirement in rape trials partly because of the accept-
ance of the three premises of the cautionary instruction.)), Kentucky (Holland v. Commonwealth,
272 S.W.2d 458, 459-60 (Ky. 1954) (The cautionary instruction justifies strict appellate scrutiny, i.e.,
taking "great care" in reviewing the trial court's verdict.)), Michigan (People v. Jordan, 23 Mich.
App. 375, 384-85, 178 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1970) (In "jurisdictions where the evidence is exceptionally
close," the failure to give a cautionary instruction upon request justifies reversal.)), Nebraska (Ara-
bian, supra note 14, at 597 (1978) (cautionary instruction given at end of all rape trials, but wording
left to judge's discretion); see also Nebraska (State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 335, 299 N.W.2d 421,
428 (1980) (example of the discretionary wording of the cautionary instruction)), Vermont (State v.
Wilkins, 66 Vt. 1, 16-17, 28 A. 323, 327-28 (1893) (jury must be cautious before convicting in rape
trial)), and West Virginia (State v. Jenkins, 346 S.E.2d 802, 805-06 (W. Va. 1986) (cautionary in-
struction mandatory both when requested and when victim's testimony is not corroborated by other
witnesses)).
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rate the victim's testimony,20 which is the case in an overwhelming
majority of rape trials.
II. THE EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION
A. Rape is Not a Charge That is Easy to Make.
The first element of the cautionary instruction is that rape is a
charge which is easily made. Although this view is commonplace, there
is simply no supporting data.21,
Rape is the most underreported of the violent crimes. 22 Between 50
percent and 90 percent of all rapes are not reported to the police.23
These figures indicate a large number of "hidden rapes."' 24 Despite a
number of recent reforms in the rape laws, such as rape-shield statutes, 25
20. A cautionary instruction will often be issued in uncorroborated rape cases when the presid-
ing judge perceives that the female victim is lying. See Arkansas (Beasley v. State, 258 Ark. 84, 90,
522 S.W.2d 365, 368 (1975); Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 940, 943, 497 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1973)), Con-
necticut (State v. Brauneis, 84 Corn. 222, 227-28, 79 A. 70, 73 (1911)), Delaware (Thompson v.
State, 399 A.2d 194, 197-98 (Del. 1979); Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37, 58-59, 109 A.2d 381, 392-93
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955)), Hawaii (State v. Jones, 62 Haw. 572, 581-82, 617 P.2d
1214, 1221 (1980); State v. Dizon, 47 Haw. 444, 462-65, 390 P.2d 759, 770-71 (1964)), Kansas (State
v. Loomer, 105 Kan. 410, 412-13, 184 P. 723, 724 (1919)), Maine (State v. McFarland, 369 A.2d
227, 230 (Me. 1977)), Maryland (Rhoades v. State, 56 Md. App. 601, 608, 468 A.2d 650, 653
(1983)), Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Chapman, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 268-69, 392 N.E.2d
1213, 1218-19 (1979)), Mississippi (Watkins v. State, 134 Miss. 211, 216-17, 98 So. 537, 538-39
(1923)), New Hampshire (State v. Blake, 113 N.H. 115, 123, 305 A.2d 300, 305-06 (1973)), New
Mexico (State v. Dodson, 67 N.M. 146, 147-48, 353 P.2d 364, 365-66 (1960); State v. Clevenger, 27
N.M. 466, 471-72; 202 P. 687, 689-90 (1921)), Oklahoma (Maxwell v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 328,
340-43, 148 P.2d 214, 219-20 (1944)), Texas (Hamilton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 599, 602, 58 S.W. 93,
95 (1900)), Utah (State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1977); State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728,
729 (Utah 1976)), and Wisconsin (Connors v. State, 47 Wis. 523, 526-28, 2 N.W. 1143, 1146-47
(1879)).
21. See generally Galvin & Polk, Attrition in Case Processing: Is Rape Unique?, 20 J. REs.
CRIME & DELINQ. 126, 127-31 (1983) (Studies show rape is reported less than any other violent
crime.); LeGrande, Rape and Rape Laws" Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919, 920-
22 (1973) (Studies confirm that most rapes are not reported to the police.).
22. See Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am. CRiM. L. REv.
335, 347-49 (1973) (According to some estimates, less than five percent of all rapes are reported,
making rape the least reported crime in the Uniform Crime Reports.).
23. E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VicTim 9 (1976); Check & Malamuth, An Empirical Assess-
ment of Some Feminist Hypotheses About Rapes 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 414, 415-16 (1985);
Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal, and Situational Characteristics, 9 PsY-
CHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 193, 194-95 (1985).
24. See Koss, supra note 23, at 195.
25. See FED. R. EviD. 412(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case
in which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or opinion
evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible.");
Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courtr A Proposal for the Second Decade,
70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 (1986) (Rape-shield statutes "reversed the long-standing common-law
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the reporting rate remains low. 26
Many factors contribute to this low reporting rate: insensitive and
prejudicial police attitudes about rape,27 the guilt women place on them-
selves,28 the harsh attitude of district attorneys toward victims, 29 the hu-
miliating publicity of a rape trial,30 the stigma attached to a woman
charging that a sexual offense has been committed against her,31 and es-
pecially a victim's inevitable ordeal at trial. 32
Even if a rape is reported, the charges may later be dropped: a study
in Denver found that 38% of rape victims drop their charges soon after
filing them.33 Nor does the reporting of a rape always result in an arrest;
in fact, according to a Philadelphia study, the arrest rate in rape cases is
only 57.7% 34 -which means almost half of the reported rape assailants
are not apprehended by the police. Even after arrest, a trial is not as-
sured. The preliminary hearing often frightens the victim into dropping
doctrine that permitted a defendant accused of rape to inquire into the complainant's 'character for
unchastity.' ").
26. Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1657-59 (1984); see
also J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 26-28 (1982) (A.
study done after passage of a sweeping rape reform law in Michigan indicates "rape law reform...
does not seem to contribute to reporting trends."); Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Process-
ing, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 191, 202-03 (1985) (In California, rape reform has not increased the flow
of rape cases into court.).
27. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 364-65 (One police officer characterized rape vic-
tims as "[p]rostitutes who didn't get their money."); LeDoux & Hazelwood, Police Attitudes and
Beliefs Toward Rape, 13 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 211, 219 (small group of police officers are insen-
sitive to rape victims).
28. See Steward, Hughes, Frank, Anderson, Kendall & West, The Aftermath of Rape, 175 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 90, 93 (1987) (Women who do not struggle during rape or who are
raped by an acquaintance are likely to feel guilty and often blame themselves for the incident.).
29. See L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note 2, at 133-48 (District attorneys ask frank
questions that show they doubt victim's story.).
30. Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1374
(1972).
31. Id.
32. See supra note 2; see also S. ErRICH, supra note 1, at 58-71 (Modern law of force, which
often requires a victim to physically resist her attacker in order to show a lack of consent, reflects
court's distrust of the victim.); C. HURSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH RAPE 163 (1977) (criminal justice
system outmoded in the way it treats rape victims); T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN,
supra note 1, at 211-26 (victim often traumatized by ordeal of rape trial); Landau, Rape" The Victim
as Defendant, 10 TRIAL, July-Aug. 1974, at 19-22 (victim rather than defendant placed on trial);
Resick, The Trauma of Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 52, 57-58 (1984)
(Appearance in court by a victim is a terrifying experience due to the presence of the attacker and
the reliving of the incident and, as a result, the victim often suffers depression after the trial.).
33. C. HuRSCH, supra note 32, at 110-14 (reasons to drop rape charges include fear of trial,
intimidation by friends of attacker and police resistance about prosecuting the case).
34. See T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, supra note 1, at 124-25.
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her charges. 35 And even if the victim is willing to go to trial, the prose-
cutor will often refuse to proceed because-in the prosecutor's judg-
ment-the victim does not have a perfect case.36
Once a rape victim succeeds in bringing her assailant to trial, she
still faces a daunting process. Rape trials have been described as a "sec-
ond assault" on the victim.37 The Aftermath of Rape best describes the
ordeal of a complainant during and after the trial:
[The rape] trial meets all ... conditions of successful degradation cere-
monies. She [the victim] must testify (he [the defendant] need not) and
thereby be confronted and transformed into something viewed as infer-
ior in the local scheme of social types .... Indeed, it is before many
witnesses that the victim is denounced and her motives questioned ....
Fears and emotional turmoil that may have subsided earlier are once
again aroused .... It is not surprising, therefore, to find that it is in
the areas of nightmares, heterosexual relationships, and social activi-
ties that adjustment difficulties are likely to develop for the victim who
has been to trial. 38
Even if the victim is willing to subject herself to the terrors of a rape trial,
she must still face the fact that winning such a trial is an extremely ardu-
ous process. 39 Aside from the emotional trauma, the victim must over-
come several legal obstacles, such as proving she did not consent4' and
proving she was forced into intercourse.41
In short, a charge of rape is not easily made: it is in fact a difficult
accusation to make and a traumatic charge to carry through to trial. The
sheer number of charges made that do not result in a trial suggests that
only the most adamant of victims-and the strongest of cases-will sur-
vive. Considering the ordeals a victim must go through to reach trial,
35. Id. at 170-71 (Over 15% of all rape charges are dismissed because the victim is terrified of
facing her attacker and recounting her story before strangers.).
36. See S. ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 17-18. Prosecutors do not have to reveal the reasons for
their dismissal of rape complaints. They are likely to dismiss a rape complaint that is not absolutely
convincing, e.g., the victim and the defendant know each other or the victim is not physically
harmed or there is little corroborating evidence to support the victim's story. Id. at 17-19.
37. J. WILLIAMS & K. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 146-
69 (1981). The second assault stems from "the coming together of both historical and contemporary
attitudes about men and women, their relationships and their 'appropriate' behavior" both in and
out of the courtroom. Id. at xi-xiii; cf C. DEAN & M. DE BRUYN-KoPs, THE CRIME AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE 88 (1982) (treatment of victim by criminal process has been likened to
being "raped again").
38. T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, supra note 1, at 224-25.
39. See L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note 2, at 121-56.
40. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA 139-42
(1976) (There is "no other crime in which consent figures in the law as an issue.").
41. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 403, 312 S.E.2d 470, 472-73 (1984) (Sufficient force
was not present for a rape charge when the assailant threatened the victim with violence, pushed her
legs apart, made her cry, and penetrated her.).
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there is no justification for instructing the jury that rape is an easy accu-
sation to make.
B. A Rape Charge is Not Difficult to Disprove.
The second element of the instruction is a caution that rape is a
difficult charge for the defendant to disprove. Supporters of the caution-
ary instruction argue that without an added note of caution the defend-
ant would be left at the mercy of a jury eager to convict despite
innocence.42
This assumption is also of questionable validity. Far from being a
difficult crime to defend, the conviction rates indicate that rape is the
easiest accusation of violent crime to disprove.43 Only 2 percent to 15
percent of the actual cases of rape ever reach the trial stage.44 Even in
cases that do go to trial, a conviction is unlikely.4 5 Two factors make the
charge of rape easier to disprove than other violent felonies: first, the
victim is a convenient target for the focus of the trial; second, the jury is
often reluctant to weigh the evidence impartially.
Unlike trials for other violent crimes, the focus in the rape trial is
usually on the victim rather than on the defendant.46 The main reason
for this focus is the lack of witnesses to corroborate a woman's charge of
rape.47 As one commentator noted, "oath against oath at all times
42. See, eg., Ploscowe, Sex Offenses The American Legal Context, 1960 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 217, 222-23 (requirement of corroboration by other material evidence needed to offset the
jurors' indignation about the "railroading" of innocent men); Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape,
67 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1138-39 (1967) (safeguards needed to protect defendant in rape case from
jury's outrage).
43. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 879-80, 538 P.2d 247, 257-58, 123 Cal. Rptr.
119, 129-30 (1975) (Rape is at the bottom of the FBI's successful prosecution list.); H. FEILD & L.
BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 99 (1980) (The percentage of criminal charges ending in acquittal or
dismissal is greater for rape (46%) than for murder (32%), aggravated assault (41%) and armed
robbery (3 6%). The probability of committing a crime and not being arrested, prosecuted and found
guilty of the offense is greater for rape (96%) than for murder (72%), aggravated assault (86%) and
armed robbery (95%).); A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 113 (Only a small minority of
defendants charged with rape are convicted.); Polk, supra note 26, at 191-92 (little threat of convic-
tion for rapists).
44. Polk, supra note 26, at 203.
45. See T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, supra note 1, at 228 (A study done in
Philadelphia indicates that out of 1198 reported rapes only 158 resulted in a guilty disposition.).
46. See C. DEAN & M. DE BRUYN-KoPs, supra note 37, at 86 (At rape trials, victims are
treated worse than defendants,); Landau, supra note 32, at 19-22 (The victim is the primary focus of
the rape trial.); Note, supra note 26, at 1661-63 (The focus in a rape trial is on the victim's behavior
and reputation rather than on the defendant.).
47. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF RE-
SEARCH FINDINGS 198-99 (1979) (study done of rapes in District of Columbia found witnesses were
present in only 9% of the cases); cf Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1098 (1986) (speculating that
the American practice of abandoning inquiry into the defendant's state of mind makes the rape trial
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means the word of a woman against the word of a man."'48 As a result,
an effective strategy of defense attorneys is to blame the victim and
thereby destroy her credibility.49
This shifting of focus is accomplished through a lengthy and often
explicit cross-examination of the victim.50 Typical subjects examined in-
clude the resistance of the victim to her attacker, their past relationship,
the victim's sexual history and character, her emotional state, and the
promptness with which she reported the rape.5' As a result, the jury
may base its decision on the character of the victim rather than on the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.5 2 If the victim dresses seductively or
goes hitchhiking alone, the defendant may be acquitted regardless of the
legal evidence. 53
In an attempt to counteract the skewed focus of rape trials, some
states have enacted safeguards to protect the victim and shift the focus of
the jury away from her past.54 These well-intentioned laws symbolically
help to lessen the victim's ordeal; practically, however, such reform has
not decreased the difficulty of proving a rape charge. 55
The selective biases of the jury may also make the charge of rape
easier to disprove. A selective bias may result from factors such as the
socioeconomic status, race, or respectability of either the victim or the
defendant.56 Thus, a jury is often reluctant to convict a male defend-
ant-blaming the victim instead for putting herself in a precarious situa-
"not... an inquiry into the guilt of the defendant (is he a rapist?) but of the victim (was she really
raped? did she consent?)").
48. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 369.
49. See L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note 2, at 212-13 (focusing attention on victim is
devastatingly effective).
50. See id. at 207-12 (typical cross-examination strategies include baiting the victim, monotony
and rapid-fire attack).
51. Id. at 171-93.
52. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 43, at 117-19 (Besides the defendant's race, the major
factors in the jury's decision of guilt or innocence are the victim's race, physical attractiveness and
sexual experience.).
53. See S. BESSMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE 150-53 (1984) (Although not legally relevant, the
contributory negligence of the victim, e.g., being a prostitute or going to a bar alone, influences the
jury's verdict, especially in cases without extrinsic violence.); see also infra notes 70-72 and accompa-
nying text.
54. See Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Em-
pirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REv. 543, 562-63 (1980).
55. Cf. Note, supra note 26, at 1664-66 (There is no tangible evidence indicating that the con-
tribution of the rape reform movement, as evidenced by rape-shield laws, has eased the lot of the
victim during a rape trial; the reform movement does have symbolic significance.).
56. Thornton, Effect of Rape Victim's Attractiveness in a Jury Simulation, 3 PSPB 666, 666
(1977) (Studies indicate socioeconomic status, race and respectability of either victim or defendant
biases the jury.).
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tion.57 For example, many jurors have false preconceptions, such as
"women falsely accuse innocent men of rape, [and] women provoke rape
by their physical appearance."58 Rape trials are also often held before
male-dominated juries59 reluctant to find another man guilty of rape
without aggravating circumstances, such as the presence of a gun or
physical violence.60 Even when female jurors are part of the rape pro-
ceedings, this pattern of selective bias does not change.61 Many women
jurors cannot empathize and in fact have harsh views of rape victims
with "bad reputations. ' 62 Finally, many jurors still cling to the notion of
"women's rape fantasies," which maintains that women enjoy being
raped. 63
Two independent studies confirm this selective bias. Thomas Mc-
Cahill, Linda Meyer and Arthur Fischman extensively studied rape in
the Philadelphia area.64 They compared bench trials to jury trials: con-
victions were obtained in 51.1% of the bench trials, compared with only
44% for the jury trials.65 Another study, by Harry Kalven and Hans
Zeisel, 66 who also compared bench and jury trials, found even more re-
markable results. In aggravated rape cases with evidence of physical vio-
lence, the jury acquitted in 12% of the cases in which the judge would
have convicted. In simple rape cases, the figure jumped to 60%. The
authors termed these results "startling. ' 67 No contradictory studies ex-
ist, for the simple reason that there is "no data to support the view that
57. Gaicopassi & Wilkinson, Rape and the Devalued Victim, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 367, 369-
70 (1985) (Absent violence, rape juries often assume "the victim placed herself in a hazardous situa-
tion and should take the blame for the consequences.").
58. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 43, at 47. One especially egregious example is the case
of a nineteen-year-old secretary attacked in a Los Angeles county parking lot. A witness made a
positive identification of the assailant and the district attorney believed the case of rape was strong.
The jury rendered a verdict of not guilty. One juror explained that it was too difficult to believe that
anyone could possibly want to rape such a plain female. Iad
59. See Note, supra note 22, at 344 (Women are often asked to be excused from rape trials due
to a perceived lack of objectivity.).
60. Note, supra note 30, at 1379-80.
61. See Note, supra note 22, at 344. But see Thornton, supra note 56, at 669 (Female jurors are
more likely to render a guilty verdict in a rape trial than their male counterparts but are less severe
in their assessment of punishment.).
62. Note, supra note 22, at 344 (Female jurors are just as harsh as male jurors on rape victims
with poor reputations because they cannot empathize with them.).
63. See S. ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 5 (The women's rape fantasy holds that women "desire to
be forcibly ravished.").
64. T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, supra note 1, at 7-20 (explaining methodology
and goals of the authors' Philadelphia study of rape victims).
65. Id. at 195-96.
66. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 33-54 (1966) (explaining sample and
research design the authors used in reaching their conclusions).
67. Id. at 253.
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juries are prejudiced in favor of rape victims." '68
One feature of jurors' selective bias is the frequency with which the
statutory law is ignored. Once intercourse and force are established in a
rape case the only major issue left is consent. 69 There is a growing body
of literature, however, which suggests that a jury will make up special
extra-legal defenses to acquit the defendant. 70 The most important of
these is the assumption of risk defense. 71 Hubert Feild and Leigh Bienen
explain that "[w]hen the jurors perceive that the woman has precipitated
or encouraged the assault by her appearance or behavior, they are likely
to apply the 'assumption of risk' criterion. '72
Thus, a female is unlikely to prevail in a rape trial if, in the view of
the jurors, she somehow "contributed" to the rape by tempting the de-
fendant or by putting herself in a vulnerable position. Victims of other
crimes are simply not treated with such suspicion. Imagine a bank rob-
ber acquitted because he was tempted by the money in the bank or an
aggravated assault charge dropped because the victim was small and
presented an inviting target. Only rapists are accorded this special jury
treatment.
Thus, juries in rape trials often focus on the victim and subject her
to heavy scrutiny. At the same time, these juries are often predisposed
to believe in the innocence of the defendant. These circumstances dispell
the assumption that a rape charge is hard to disprove.
C. A Rape Victim's Testimony Does Not Need to be Scrutinized More
Carefully than the Testimony of Other Witnesses.
The last element of the cautionary instruction is that the victim's
testimony requires more careful scrutiny than the testimony of other wit-
nesses.73 The implied assumption that the victim's testimony is inher-
ently untrustworthy is the most pervasive myth surrounding the crime of
rape.74
68. S. BESsMER, supra note 53, at 126.
69. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 66, at 249-59.
70. See S. BESSMER, supra note 53, at 275-88; E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VIcrIM 14 (1976);
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 66, at 249; Note, supra note 22, at 339-43.
71. See H. KALVEN & H. Zms., supra note 66, at 249-57.
72. See H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 43, at 119.
73. See generally E. HILBERMAN, supra note 70, at 10-11 (during rape trial, victim's testimony
often disbelieved).
74. See Simpson, The "Blackmail Myth" and the Prosecution of Rape and Its Attempt in 18th
Century London: The Creation of a Legal Tradition, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 101, 106-09
(1986) (myth that females frequently make up charges of rape prevalent both today and in the eigh-
teenth century).
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1. Statistical Evidence. The numbers are quite persuasive. Rape
victims are much more frequently perceived as lying than are victims of
other violent crimes. Of all forcible rape charges, twenty-one percent are
rejected at screening due to the questionable credibility of the complain-
ant, compared to two percent in aggravated assault cases, seven percent
in robbery cases and two percent in burglary cases. Of all forcible rape
charges, seven percent are dismissed because the complainant's story is
considered implausible or contradictory to the testimony of others, com-
pared to one percent in aggravated assault cases, four percent in robbery
cases and one percent in burglary cases.75
The Gary Dotson case, in which Cathleen Crowell Webb recanted
her allegations of rape years after her alleged assailant had been sent to
prison, garnered national headlines and furthered the mistaken belief
that women falsely accuse men of rape.76 Outside of incest cases, how-
ever, the Webb incident is the only reported recantation of a rape accusa-
tion in the last ten years. 77 Even incest recantations are suspect-family
members often deny to themselves that incest actually occurs.78 Indeed,
given the many pressures brought upon women who bring charges of
rape, it is somewhat suprising that rape testimony is so rarely re-
canted 79 -and somewhat telling that the one recantaton of rape in the
last ten years attracted so much national attention.
Indeed, a "blackmail myth" 80 has surrounded the crime of rape
since the time of Lord Hale. 81 The blackmail myth, according to Antony
Simpson, "is the legal crystallization of the assumption that the com-
plainant in a rape prosecution is quite likely to have made her charge
from motives corrupt, vindictive, or otherwise dishonest. '82
Despite the pervasive myths, however, three separate studies con-
firm that women generally do not lie about being raped. One study, un-
dertaken in Denver, examined police rape reports and found that in only
three percent of the cases did the complainant admit to lying or did the
police ultimately conclude from other evidence that the rape charge was
fabricated. 83
75. Williams, Few Convictions in Rape Cases: Empirical Evidence Concerning Some Alternative
Explanations, 9 J. CRIM. JusT. 29, 32 (1981).
76. For an exhaustive analysis of the Gary Dotson case, see Taylor, Rape and Women's Credi-
bility: Problems of Recantations and False Accusations Echoed in the Case of Cathleen Crowell Webb
and Gary Dotson, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 74-87 (1987).
77. Id. at 83.
78. Id. at 83-84.
79. Id. at 84.
80. Simpson, supra note 74, at 106-28.
81. Id. at 106.
82. Id.
83. C. HURSCH, supra note 32, at 84.
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A second study looked at 100 consecutive cases involving com-
plaints of rape in Dade County, Florida and found that only seven per-
cent of the cases were definitely not rape, and only another fifteen percent
were labeled questionable.84 Most importantly, all of these complaints
were dismissed as unfounded.8 5 The fact that a rape charge is labeled
unfounded does not mean the victim was lying; 86 it merely means there
are not enough facts for the police to conduct an investigation 87 and, as a
result, the case is screened out of the system well before trial. 88 Other
factors often play a role in this decision-factors that have little to do
with whether a rape actually occurred: how quickly a rape victim re-
ported the attack to the police after the incident occurred; 89 the physical
condition of the victim;90 the struggle the victim put up before being
raped;91 her previous sexual history;92 the behavior of the victim prior to
the rape;93 and the race of both the victim and her attacker. 94 Com-
plaints are even labeled unfounded when the attacks occur outside the
local jurisdiction or the victim fails to appear to discuss the incident fur-
ther with the police. 95 For better or worse, the predilection of police to
84. Schiff, Statistical Features of Rapa 14 J. FoRENSIC SC. 102, 108 (1969).
85. Ia at 108-09.
86. See C. HURSCH, supra note 32, at 83-84 (In Denver, 9 cases out of 131 were labeled as
unfounded because the rape happened outside the Police Department's geographical jurisdiction.).
87. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 47, at 207 (" '[U]nfounded' has been used synonymously
with 'false report.' But 'unfounded' is a term describing a false report from the law enforcement
frame of reference and is based on the inability of law enforcers to verify the claim of rape."). Some
of the factors police use to classify a rape charge as unfounded have little to do with the conduct of
the assailant. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 366-68 (police likely to label date rapes, rapes
in cars, rapes when victim intoxicated and rapes in which victim did not scream as unfounded). See
generally Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape
in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 277, 280-81 (1968)'(In Philadelphia, police investigators label
one out of every five reported rapes as unfounded.).
88. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 47, at 108-09; see also S. BESSMER, supra note 53, at
116-21 (Most false reports of rape are screened out early in the investigation process. Even if a few
slip through, the adversary process is an excellent mechanism to catch false complaints.).
89. Comment, supra note 87, at 282-86 (The sooner a rape complaint is reported the less
chance that an investigator will label it unfounded.).
90. Id. at 286-89 (Investigators are likely to label a rape report unfounded if there are no indi-
cations of violence.).
91. Ia at 293-99 (Because physical struggle indicates a lack of consent, investigators are un-
likely to label these cases as unfounded.).
92. Ia at 299 (Rape complainants with bad sexual reputations are less likely to be believed.); cf.
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
93. Comment, supra note 87, at 289-93 (sobriety, location of attack and previous relationship
between victim and attacker are examples of prior behavior likely to result in a rape report being
marked as unfounded).
94. Id. at 302-06 (Minority rape victims are more likely to have their complaints labeled as
unfounded by the police. The highest unfounded rate [22%] occurs when blacks rape blacks.).
95. See C. HURSCH, supra note 32, at 83-84.
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label rapes as unfounded makes a warning to juries that women black-
mail men absurd.
A third study, consisting of evidence from New York City, further
supports the proposition that women rarely fabricate rape charges. A
Rape Analysis Squad chaired by female police officers discovered that
only two percent of the rape charges brought were false, a figure no
greater than the percentage of false accusations for other felonies.96
There are a variety of reasons why these three studies indicate a low
probability that any given rape charge is fabricated. As discussed above,
rape is a highly underreported crime.97 Women's hesitancy to bring a
rape charge and the resulting trauma if they do, provide a check against
false complaints.98 Given the terrifying experiences of rape victims in
court,99 it is counterintuitive that women would falsify rape charges.
Also, "few women are likely to believe that being a rape victim would
enhance their status and worth in the eyes of others. Hence, a motive for
fabricating such experiences.., is likely to be rare indeed."100 Finally,
rape charges are no more likely to be fabricated than other charges of
violent crime, and, in fact, there is no evidence that false rape charges are
brought with any greater frequency than false charges of other crimes.101
2. Alternatives to the Cautionary Instruction. Even if there were a
significant problem with complainants falsifying rape charges, the cau-
tionary instruction would not be needed. As discussed above, certain
mechanisms make rape charges difficult to bring and even more difficult
to litigate.102 While these mechanisms, such as police and prosecutorial
discretion, often frustrate valid rape charges, they also eliminate the most
baseless ones. Because the pre-trial hurdle is already prohibitively high,
the added obstacle of the cautionary instruction is unnecessary. In addi-
tion, other mechanisms effectively screen out baseless allegations-with-
out penalizing women who actually have been raped.
The first mechanism that screens out false allegations is police dis-
96. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 366.
97. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
98. See S. BESSMER, supra note 53, at 115-16 (The fact that rape is so underreported and that
the trial is such a traumatic experience for the victim suggests that there is little motive for a com-
plainant to fabricate a rape charge.).
99. See supra notes 2, 32, 37-38 and accompanying text.
100. Russell, The Prevalence and Incidence of Forcible Rape and Attempted Rape of Females, 7
VIcriMOLOGY 81, 85 (1982).
101. See Simpson, supra note 74, at 107; see also S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 47, at 212-
13 (Studies and statistics indicate "the percentage of actual false reports of rape may be as low as or
lower than most other crimes.").
102. See S. BESSMER, supra note 53, at 114-17; LeGrande, supra note 21, at 931; Schwartz &
Clear, Toward a New Law on Rape, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 129, 132-33 (1980).
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cretion.10 3 Police investigators label many complaints of rape un-
founded.' 0 4 While this practice is over-inclusive because it often prevents
valid rape charges from being litigated, 10 5 it nonetheless is successful in
screening out nearly all false rape complaints. 10 6
A second mechanism is the pretrial interview conducted by the
prosecutor. This mechanism suffers from the same infirmity as police
discretion. Nonetheless, the pretrial interview provides prosecutors an
excellent opportunity to judge the credibility of a complainant. 0 7
Recently developed medical tests are a third mechanism that can
help determine the veracity of a rape complaint.'08 A scientific test can-
not determine if the complainant consented, but it can show whether the
female recently had intercourse and can even indicate the probability that
a rape has occured. 0 9
The adversarial nature of the trial is a fourth mechanism that fur-
nishes a check on false charges.' 10 The defense attorney is given the op-
portunity to cross-examine the victim thoroughly.
These mechanisms screen out false allegations and perform the pur-
ported function of the cautionary instruction. While some of them work
to screen out both valid and invalid claims, so long as such mechanisms
exist, the cautionary instruction is nothing more than an unnecessary
anachronism.
III. THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION IS OBSOLETE
IN MODERN SOCIETY
A. The Historical Context of the Cautionary Instruction.
Lord Hale's cautionary instruction first arose in a rape trial atypical
even by seventeenth century standards: the victim was an incompetent
103. Many complaints of rape are labeled unfounded and dropped without further investigation.
See T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, supra note 1, at 108-09 (50%-60% in Chicago, 1%-
4% in Detroit, 2%-4% in Los Angeles, 8%-19% in New York and 16%-33% in Philadelphia); Loh,
supra note 54, at 578 (15% in Seattle); Schiff, supra note 84, at 109 (19% in Dade County, Florida);
Comment, supra note 87, at 280-81, 308 (approximately 20% in Philadelphia).
104. See supra notes 85, 103 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
106. Schiff, supra note 85, at 108-09 (In Dade County, Florida, all of the false rape reports were
labeled as unfounded.).
107. Loh, supra note 54, at 582-83 (The pretrial interview between victim and prosecutor serves
two functions: to gather evidence and to evaluate the victim's credibility.).
108. See generally LeGrande, supra note 21, at 930-31 (Often rapes can be "reconstructed" using
tests such as neutron activation (body hair) analysis, disease tests, fiber analysis, blood analysis,
semen analysis and fingernail scrapings.).
109. Id. at 931.
110. See L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note 2, at 161-62; cf supra notes 2, 32, 37-38, 99
and accompanying text.
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infant witness, I and Lord Hale used the cautionary instruction solely in
this context. When later writing about more typical rape cases, Lord
Hale stated that the victim's credibility should be left to the jury. 112
The Supreme Court of California noted there is "nothing in Hale's
writings to suggest that, as a matter of course, juries should be instructed
that those who claim to be victims of sexual offenses are presumptively
entitled to less credence than those who testify as the alleged victims of
other crimes."11 3 Nonetheless, Lord Hale's instruction in one atypical
case developed into an established part of the English common law.
B. Due Process Safeguards Render Hale's Cautionary Instruction
Unnecessary.
The legal system in which Lord Hale worked did not afford many
due process safeguards to those accused of crimes. 114 Because of the in-
adequate protection for defendants, the seventeenth century did face a
problem of unwarranted rape prosecutions. In eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century London, there were at least twenty-five documented cases
of complainants being paid to falsely accuse others of rape.115 A rape
complaint conceivably could provide a convenient mechanism to extort
money from the person accused.116
Today, due process safeguards render the cautionary instruction ob-
111. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 877, 538 P.2d 247, 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 128
(1975); Note, Cautionary Instruction in Sex Offense Trial Relating Prosecutrix's Credibility to the
Nature of the Crime Charged is No Longer Mandatory; Discretionary Use is Disapproved, 4 FORD-
HAM URBAN L.J. 419, 421 (1976).
112. See M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONEA: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 633 (1778) ("The Party ravished may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a competent
witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and how far she is to be believed, must be left to the
jury, and is more or less credible according to the circumstances of fact that concur in the testi-
mony."); see also Note, Rape Instructions-Requiring Jury to Examine Rape Victim's Testimony
with Caution is Inappropriate to Modern Trial Proceedings-People v. Rincon-Pineda, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 691, 692 (1976) (Hale's cautionary instruction not meant to be given uniformly at
end of all rape trials).
113. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at 877, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
114. See generally Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194, 198 (Del. 1979) (In Lord Hale's time, due
process safeguards were relatively underdeveloped.); Note, People v. Rincon-Pineda: Rape Trials
Depart the Seventeenth Century-Farewell to Lord Hale, 11 TULSA L.J. 279, 281-82 (1975) ("Con-
trasting the state of seventeenth century criminal procedure with modem due process the court in
Rincon-Pineda demonstrated that Hale's caution was reasonable during his time. In the seventeenth
century the accused was expected to address the jury without benefit of counsel. He was not pre-
sumed innocent, and to convict him it was not necessary to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Furthermore, his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to compel their attendance at
trial were barely nascent. Therefore, the defendant was 'often pitiable, even if he ha[d] a good
case.' ").
115. Simpson, supra note 74, at 113-14.
116. See generally id. at 115-16 (Extortion may be too harsh because most blackmailers only
obtained small sums of money and many were genuine victims seeking monetary redress.).
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solete.117 The court in People v. Rincon-Pineda 118 listed several of these
safeguards: the right to present witnesses and compel their attendance,
the right to counsel and the presumption of innocence. Armed with
these "potent accouterments of due process," defendants no longer need
"the additional constraint of Hale's caution." 119
IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION
The cautionary instruction is not simply an antiquated yet harmless
tool used by state courts across the United States. It presents three legal
problems that require its prohibition.
First, the cautionary instruction, by focusing on the victim's credi-
bility, places a greater burden on her than on other witnesses at a rape
trial. 120 This judicial treatment of the victim during a rape trial is at best
arbitrary, as it singles out someone who is no more likely to lie than any
other witness. 121 As the Florida Supreme Court explained in eliminating
the caution of Lord Hale as a jury instruction, there is "no unique reason
why those accused of sexual battery should occupy a status different
from those accused of any other crime where the ultimate factual issue at
trial pivots on the word of the victim against the word of the accused." 122
Rape trials are not the only proceedings likely to be reduced to the testi-
mony of the victim against the testimony of the accused; this pattern
often arises in assault, attempted murder and robbery cases.' 23 Yet cau-
tionary instructions are limited solely to rape cases. 124
Second, the cautionary instruction usurps the traditional function of
the jury by weighing the evidence for them. The cautionary instruction,
by singling out a particular witness, serves as a "directive to the jury as to
how they should evaluate evidence, rather than a statement of law." 125
Having observed the demeanor of all the witnesses at the trial, the jury is
in a better position to evaluate the credibility of each witness if it has not
been prejudiced by a mechanical cautionary instruction.
117. See State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 434 (N.D. 1984) (The jury has an affirmative duty to
impartially weigh all of the evidence.); Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1986) (Easy access
to appellate review is among the "full panoply of due process rights.").
118. 14 Cal. 3d 864, 878, 538 P.2d 247, 256-57, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 128-29 (1975).
119. Id. at 878, 538 P.2d at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
120. State v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510, 515 (Iowa 1975) ("mhe court should not single out
any witness and burden his [or her) testimony with any suggestion which might indicate to the jury
that the court believed the witness was likely to testify falsely.").
121. See id.; see also supra notes 83-86, 96-101 and accompanying text.
122. Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1986).
123. S. BESSMER, supra note 53, at 110-11.
124. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 883, 538 P.2d 247, 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
132 (1975); Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d at 515.
125. State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1977).
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Not only does the cautionary instruction usurp an important func-
tion of the jury, it often confuses the jurors. 126 This is especially likely if
the female witness is credible and her testimony convincing. The cau-
tionary instruction, urging the jury to pay special attention to even a
credible victim's testimony, insinuates to the jury that something about
the testimony bothers the judge. As a result, the jurors become more
skeptical of the victim's credibility. 127
Third, the cautionary instruction represents an impermissible com-
ment on the evidence. This instruction closely resembles an expression
of the judge's personal opinion and is often perceived that way by the
jury. 128 The cautionary instruction is not a statement of law, 129 therefore
absent any special circumstances-such as incompetency-there is no
reason for the judge to caution the jury about the victim's testimony.
Cautioning the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony of the com-
plainant "may or may not have validity in a given case."1 30 In the Amer-
ican judicial system, it is the jury's function to evaluate the credibility of
each witness. The jury often relies on instructions from the judge for
guidance. Instructions help to "clarify the jurors' understanding of both
their task and the law." 131 As a result, instructions often influence the
ultimate outcome of the trial, especially if the instruction singles out a
specific party and asks that her testimony be scrutinized carefully. 132
When this happens at rape trials, the quest for truth is impeded.
A recent study by Oros and Elman133 addresses the impact of the
cautionary instruction. The researchers conducted two mock rape trials
using male and female jurors and compared the results. In one trial, the
jury was given a cautionary instruction, and in the other, the jury was
not. 134 The researchers concluded that "[s]ubjects (jurors) were more
lenient toward the defendant when the 'cautionary charge'.., was used
126. State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 434 (N.D. 1984).
127. See Oros & Elman, Impact of Judge's Instruction Upon Jurors' Decision The "Cautionary
Charge" in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RES. Soc. PSYCH. 28, 32-34 (1979) (cautionary in-
struction decreases victim's credibility and as result jurors are more skeptical about victim's
testimony).
128. See State v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 396, 531 P.2d 151, 153 (1975); State v. Farlett, 490 A.2d
52, 56 (R.I. 1985).
129. State v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510, 515 (Iowa 1975).
130. Id.
131. See Oros & Elman, supra note 127, at 28.
132. Cf Lyons & Regina, Mock Jurors'Behavior as a Function of Sex and Exposure to an Educa-
tional Videotape about Jury Duty, 58 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 599, 599 (1986) (judge's instructions
often influence verdict of jurors).
133. See Oros & Elman, supra note 127, at 28.
134. The text of the cautionary instruction given by the two researchers read: "The charge of
rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and more difficult to disprove; therefore, the testimony of the
complaining witness must be examined with caution." Id.
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than when other instructions were given."' 13 5 This leniency resulted in
less severe sentences and more acquittals. 136 The results of this study
support the suspicion that the cautionary instruction greatly prejudices
the jury.
Another study by Doctors Lyons and Regina 137 affirms this assess-
ment. The subjects of the study were divided into two groups. One
group viewed a video tape warning them to be cautious in their verdict;
the other group did not. A two-page edited version of a rape trial was
then given to each group of jurors. After both groups were familar with
the trial transcript, they were asked to decide whether the defendant was
guilty. Those who viewed the tape before the trial "were significantly
more cautious in assigning a guilty verdict than those who had not. ' 138
The only variable in the study was that one set of jurors was urged to be
cautious while the other set was not. This variable significantly influ-
enced the verdict of each group. In a real courtroom situation this bias
perhaps would be even greater. In the study, the mock jurors were only
presented with a video tape, while in the courtroom it is the imposing
figure of the judge who issues the cautionary instruction.
V. A RECOMMENDATION TO PROHIBIT THE CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTION
The only way to end the prejudice engendered by the cautionary
instruction is to prohibit it. There are two ways to do so: by judicial
decree,139 or through legislative enactment. 40
As long as the end result is the elimination of this antiquated in-
struction, the means are not important. Given a choice, however, this is
probably an area in which state legislatures should take the initiative.
Not all courts are willing to ban the cautionary instruction without legis-
lative guidance;' 4' as the philosophy of judicial restraint becomes more
135. Id.
136. Id. at 32-34.
137. See Lyons & Regina, supra note 132, at 599.
138. Id. at 602.
139. See supra note 13 (Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Wash-
ington and Wyoming have judicially banned the cautionary instruction).
140. See supra note 12 (Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania and South Dakota have
legislatively prohibited Lord Hale's caution.).
141. Maryland presents the best example of state court hesitation. See Rhoades v. State, 56 Md.
App. 601, 468 A.2d 650 (1983). In Rhoades, the court of special appeals recognized that the cau-
tionary instruction is outdated. Id. at 611, 468 A.2d at 655. But the court refused to eliminate it
because the General Assembly had considered and rejected previous legislation to prohibit the cau-
tionary instruction. Id. at 611-12, 468 A.2d at 655. The court concluded these actions are "indica-
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prevalent, 142 it falls to the legislatures to eliminate the instruction of
Lord Hale.
Colorado provides the best model of a legislative prohibition of the
cautionary instruction. 143 The Colorado statute states:
[In rape trials] the jury shall not be instructed to examine with caution
the testimony of the victim solely because of the nature of the charge,
nor shall the jury be instructed that such a charge is easy to make but
difficult to defend against, nor shall any similar instruction be given. 144
This instruction cleanly eliminates the cautionary instruction without be-
ing too broad. There is still room in an especially volatile rape case for
the judge, in his or her discretion, to caution the jury to view the testi-
mony of all the witnesses in the trial with caution. There are many ex-
amples of instructions, similar to Colorado's, which caution the jury
without subjecting the alleged victim to special scrutiny145 or singling out
the testimony of the victim.
CONCLUSION
Despite its widespread use in rape trials, the cautionary instruction
is based on three erroneous assumptions. Rape is not an easily made
charge; rape is not a difficult charge to disprove, especially when com-
pared with other violent crimes; and the rape victim is no more likely to
fabricate a charge than other witnesses at the trial-besides, the adver-
sarial process is designed to catch the occasional complainant who falsi-
fies a charge of rape.
Not only are the elements of the cautionary instruction empirically
invalid and legally erroneous, the instruction itself is taken out of its his-
torical context. Lord Chief Justice Hale cautioned a jury three hundred
years ago in a case dealing with a mentally incompetent complainant.
Given the widespread changes in procedural due process, the cautionary
instruction should be buried with other legal relics of the past. Any pro-
tive of the legislature's intent to retain the use of the Lord Hale instruction under the proper factual
circumstances." Id. at 612, 468 A.2d at 655.
142. Cf Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
823, 823-32 (1986) (original intent is only legitimate basis for interpreting the Constitution).
143. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-408 (1986).
144. Id.
145. See, eg., State v. Jones, 62 Haw. 572, 582, 617 P.2d 1214, 1221 (1980) ("In evaluating a
witness, you may consider the appearance and demeanor of a witness on the witness stand, his
manner of testifying, his degree of intelligence, his apparent candor or frankness or lack thereof, his
interest, if any, in the result of the case, his temper, feeling or bias, if any has been shown, his
character as shown by the evidence, his means and opportunity of acquiring information, the
probability or improbability of his testimony, and all other circumstances surrounding the witness and
bearing upon his credibility." (quoting People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 884, 538 P.2d 247,
261, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 133 (1975))).
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bative value the cautionary instruction may have is substantially out-
weighed by its prejudicial impact.
It is immaterial whether the legislature or the judiciary takes the
lead in prohibiting the cautionary instruction. What is important is that
the instruction be eliminated as quickly as possible, so that the victim of
rape is no longer arbitrarily prejudiced at the conclusion of an already
burdensome trial.
A. Thomas Morris
